A problem for the eternity solution

✍ Scribed by David Widerker

• Publisher: Springer Netherlands
• Year: 1991
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 463 KB
• Volume: 29
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0020-7047
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00133807

✦ Synopsis

Consider the following reductio argument against the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom:

God exists at every moment of time, and is essentially omniscient in the sense that it is logically impossible for him to believe a false proposition, or to fail to believe any true proposition. 'God' is a proper name.

(Premise) Jack mows his lawn at T3, and it was within Jack's power at T2 to bring it about that he does not mow his lawn at T3. (Premise) God believes at T1 that Jack mows his lawn at T3. (By (a) and (b)) If q is a logically necessary condition for p, and q does not obtain, then an agent has it within his power at T to bring it about that p only if he has it within his power at T to bring it about that q. (Here 'p' and 'q' range over dated states of affairs like the sun is shining at T3, Jack eats lunch at T4, etc.) (Premise) 1 That it is not the case that God believes at T1 that Jack mows his lawn at T3, is a logically necessary condition for Jack's not mowing his lawn at T3. (By (a)) It is within Jack's power at T2 to bring it about that God does not believe at T1 that Jack mows his lawn at T3. (By (b), (c), (G) and (PRW)).

But the conjunction of (d) and (G) contradicts the intuitive principle that we do not have power over the past. 2 * I would like to thank