This paper analyzes the welfare economics of three arrangements for purchasing health insurance: competitive markets in which consumers are free to choose among options with different levels of coverage and prices; systems with compulsory partial pooling which permit private firms to sell supplement
β¦ LIBER β¦
A note on the specification of interfirm communication in insurance markets with adverse selection
β Scribed by Martin F Hellwig
- Book ID
- 113181053
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 1988
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 619 KB
- Volume
- 46
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0022-0531
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
The role of government in health insuran
β
Roger Feldman; Carlos Escribano; Laura PellisΓ©
π
Article
π
1998
π
John Wiley and Sons
π
English
β 104 KB
π 2 views
Adverse selection and categorical discri
β
R Strohmenger; A Wambach
π
Article
π
2000
π
Elsevier Science
π
English
β 225 KB
Experts against adverse selection: A not
β
John P Bigelow
π
Article
π
1985
π
Elsevier Science
π
English
β 948 KB
093047 (E10) Consumer risk perceptions a
π
Article
π
1997
π
Elsevier Science
π
English
β 80 KB
creased understanding of that business is critical to continued success for both reinsurers and their clients. The purpose of this paper is to describe a framework for an integrated pricing and reserving process on a individual risk basis. Utilizing this framework, increasing levels of sophisticatio
Worker demand for health insurance in th
β
Michael Chernew; Kevin Frick; Catherine G. McLaughlin
π
Article
π
1997
π
Elsevier Science
π
English
β 310 KB
223038 (E10) Pooling and separating equi
π
Article
π
1998
π
Elsevier Science
π
English
β 95 KB