Green and Laffont (1979: 44) have pointed out that there is essentially only one demand-revealing (DR) mechanism, to which the varied proposals in the literature must be reducible. But the relation among versions of DR is often obscure. This note gives a geometrical treatment of the underlying mech
A Note on Demand-Revealing
โ Scribed by Howard Margolis
- Book ID
- 125287426
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1983
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 777 KB
- Volume
- 40
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0048-5829
- DOI
- 10.2307/30023666
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
Demand-revealing mechanisms allow individuals to influence social choice subject to a special tax designed to elicit truthful revelation of preferences. Either directly (as in Tideman and Tullock, 1976; based on earlier work by E. C. Clarke) or indirectly (as in Groves and Ledyard, 1977), 1 the indi
Coalitions under demand revealing ## Notes T. NICOLAUS TIDEMAN and GORDON TULLOCK\* Riker's (1979) criticism of the demand revealing process 1 essentially involves pointing out a number of opportunities for coalitions that are raised by the process. He apparently uses the word coalition a little