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A non-cooperative interpretation of bargaining sets

✍ Scribed by Ezra Einy; David Wettstein

Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 1999
Tongue: English
Weight: 66 KB
Volume: 4
Category: Article
ISSN: 1434-4750
DOI: 10.1007/s100580050035

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