A new impossible differential attack on SAFER ciphers
β Scribed by Shihui Zheng; Licheng Wang; Yixian Yang
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2010
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 583 KB
- Volume
- 36
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0045-7906
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
This paper presents an improved impossible differential cryptanalysis of SAFER ciphers, which uses the miss-in-the-middle technique developed by Biham et al. We analyze 3.75-round SAFER SK-64, 1 using 2 45 chosen plaintexts, 2 38 bytes memory and 2 42 half round computations. Furthermore, the new impossible differential attack on 3.75-round SAFER+/ 128 uses 2 78 chosen plaintexts, 2 75 half round computations and 2 68 bytes memory. And attack on 3.75-round SAFER++/128 uses 2 78 data, 2 66 time, and 2 62 memory.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
A statistical approach to cryptanalysis of a memoryless function of clock-controlled shift registers is introduced. In the case of zero-order correlation immunity, an algorithm for a shift register initial state reconstruction based on the sequence comparison concept is proposed. A constrained Leven