Based on what appears to be required for fully supporting a proposal for policy action, a series of interrelated propositional types is suggested as a tool for the design and critique of policy arguments. The kinds of criticisms to which different propositional types are susceptible and the impacts of these on a policy argument are explored as are the uses persons in different roles might make of these criticisms. Finally, as an example, the typology is applied to a portion of the President's 1973 State of the Union Address.
In policy analysis, as well as politics in general, one must sooner or later be persuasive. Equally important is the ability to analyze such persuasion. The purpose of this discussion is to formulate explicitly a structure of policy argument, which can in turn provide a tool for its analysis. That is, we are concerned here with a form of logic which, as with all logic, can be double-edged.
The approach here is to specify in the form of a series of propositional types the components which a complete policy argument must contain. By "complete" is meant an argument which is "rationally persuasive" in terms of ordinary logic. It is not the intent here to suggest that all policy decisions are made by complete, rationally persuasive logic. But it is argued that policy proposals which have been prepared to meet the requirements of such logic are more likely to be turned into action than those which have not.
The structure of analysis outlined in the section below is offered after considerable thought and some empirical testing, as a tool useful to the student of public policy as well as the seasoned veteran. Like all tools, it may be subject to further refinement, and dialog to that end would be welcome.