A further critique of Reichenbach's cosmological argument

✍ Scribed by William Lane Craig

• Publisher: Springer Netherlands
• Year: 1978
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 406 KB
• Volume: 9
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0020-7047
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00138730

✦ Synopsis

Reichenbach has formulated a fairly typical version of the Thomist cosmdogical argument based on the principle of efficient causality) More recently, he has defended himself against the allegation by Houston Craighead that the pro.of is fallacious because the argument in support of the causal premfiss is question-begging.-" I think that Craighead is right that the argument is question-begging, but at the same time I doubt that this provides a good reason for rejecting the proof as a whole, which suffers from more serious de-fMencies.

Reichenbach wants to prove that every contingent being must have a cause of its existence, a contingent being being defined as a being which could at any moment just as easily not exist as exist. In support of this premiss, he presents this .syllogism: all contingent beings have their existence accidental to their essence; that which has its existence accidental to its essence derives its existence from something; therefore, all contingent beings derive their existence from something. Premiss one is true because a contingent being is a being which can not-exist. Therefore, its existence cannot be essential to its essence, or it would be a necessary being, one that cannot not exist. Premiss two is true because it is of the nature of an accident to be dependent, for if it were not it would be a substance, capable of existing in and of itself. Thus, whatever is accidental is dependent on something; it is either caused by its own nature or by something else. Therefore, all contingent beings must be caused?

I think the argument fails on a couple of counts. First, it seems to