A Frequency-Dependent Natural Selection Model for the Evolution of Social Cooperation Networks
โ Scribed by Scott A. Boorman and Paul R. Levitt
- Book ID
- 123651476
- Publisher
- National Academy of Sciences
- Year
- 1973
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 519 KB
- Volume
- 70
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0027-8424
- DOI
- 10.2307/62295
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
The evolution of cooperation is studied in a lattice-structured population, in which each individual plays the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game with its neighbors. The population includes Tit-for-Tat (TFT, a cooperative strategy) and All Defect (AD, a selfish strategy) distributed over the lattice p
Following Ewens' interpretation about Fisher's fundamental theorem of natural selection, the matrix game model for diploid populations undergoing non-overlapping, discrete generations is investigated. The total genetic variance is decomposed and it is shown that the partial change in the mean "tness