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A dynamic game of coalition formation under ambiguity

✍ Scribed by Giuseppe De Marco; Maria Romaniello

Publisher: Springer
Year: 2010
Tongue: English
Weight: 325 KB
Volume: 15
Category: Article
ISSN: 1432-7643
DOI: 10.1007/s00500-010-0573-3

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This paper describes a pure-exchange, continuous-time economy with two heterogeneous agents and complete markets. A novel feature of the economy is that agents perceive some security returns as ambiguous in the sense often attributed to Frank Knight. The equilibrium is described completely in closed