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083052 (M54) The complex politics of catastrophe economics : Noll R.G., Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1996, Volume 12, nr. 2/3, pp. 141–146


Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
1997
Tongue
English
Weight
184 KB
Volume
19
Category
Article
ISSN
0167-6687

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